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Although Government support for agriculture has a long history in Canada, the
extent and importance of this involvement has grown substantially in the last
two decades.  In particular, Government-sanctioned interventions in farm
markets and Government-financed  expenditures in the agricultural sector have
become frequent in the seventies.  From a position of  little (if  not negative)
protection in the fifties, Canadian agriculture is now extensively affected by
the public policy measures of economic regulation and subsidization.
Financial constraints faced by Governments in the current eighties decade are
forcing reconsideration of  the large Government expenditure required by
present farm programs ($1 billion in 1980, Lattimore, table A.1).  But,  in
turning away from direct financial outlays, market  intervention is  continuing
to be used as a  major tool of agricultural policy.  One can see evidence of
this in recent Federal Government plans  to introduce a red-meat marketing
board and an agricultural trade Crown operation.
The issue remains  large and has been the subject of some controversy.  As
early as 1969, the Federal Task Force on Agriculture challenged this trend
toward increased Government interventions.  In the mid-seventies, the Food
Prices Review Board raised similar concerns, and recently the Economic Council
of Canada completed a major study of  regulation in Canadian agriculture
(Forbes, Hughes, and Warley).  This paper follows similar lines of  inquiry by
attempting to measure some of the economic effects of Canada's major farm
programs.  More narrowly, my purpose in this paper is  to analyze Government
intervention, in some detail, for six agricultural commodities to provide
estimates of their social efficiency (resource allocation)  losses and income
transfers among selected groups.
The choice of the six commodities reflects my assessment of agricultural
policy developments in the seventies.  During this period, efforts to
stabilize farm prices and  incomes continued from earlier years, and there was
a substantial increase in net Federal Government expenditures to agriculture,
which grew at an annual real rate of 3.2 percent from 1970 to 1978  (Forbes,
Hughes and Warley, p.  12).  But, the two developments which seem particularly
noteworthy to me are the  increasing  cost of maintaining the statutory (Crow)
rates for rail transportation of export grain and  the increase in the number
of marketing boards which possess the power to control supply and choose
price.  As a consequence, I  have chosen to examine those commodities directly
affected by these developments:  grains and oilseeds  (specifically wheat,
barley, and  rapeseed), poultry meat (broilers), eggs, and milk.  These
commodities, incidentally, account for almost 60 percent of all farms and
total farm cash receipts in 1981.
This paper is  organized to first discuss the bases for Canadian agricultural
policy.  Following a brief outline of domestic agricultural policy, in the
next section, the paper turns to measurement of various economic effects for
each of the six commodities, and ends with some conclusions.
21Bases  for  Domestic  Agricultural  Policy
There would seem to be a long list of widely held perceptions in Canada which
can be considered as the political, social, and economic bases for domestic
agricultural policy.  At the more general  level, Forbes, Hughes, and Warley
include influential perceptions that farmers are a beleagured minority opposed
by the hostile forces of nature; by rapacious and  inefficient suppliers,
processors,  and handlers;  and by the subsidized producers of other countries;
and that farmers are being rewarded  for their efforts with meager and unstable
returns.  And, who can doubt that the physiocratic-agricultural
fundamentalists' beliefs that farming is  an activity that has a  value that is
greater than its contribution to economic product at market prices, that
farmers are people with a  disproportionate  share of social virtues, and that
family sized  farms should be maintained as the basic economic and social unit
in agriculture and in  rural society are ideological notions  that still hold
powerful popular and political sway.
Somewhat more specifically, there appears to be a  distrust of unregulated farm
markets by many governments and farmers.  There is  a  widely held perception
that farmers have insufficient bargaining power.  Accompanying the latter view
are beliefs that increased market power by farmers would only neutralize the
existing market power of processing, distributing, retailing, and supplying
firms, and that farm monopolies will be  less burdensome than nonfarm
monopolies.  There is  a  growing farm-level demand from those sectors with
rapid changes in  technology to control their own markets by raising farm
prices and controlling aggregate supplies.  Importantly, this demand is  met by
a  willingness on the part of governments  to act to buffer the effects of
technical change.  Finally, for reasons given above and partly due to the
success of farm-interest groups, there appears to be a  political desire to
redistribute income to  farms.
Two economy-wide concerns affect agricultural policy.  First, in  line with an
overall objective of enhancing economic growth and development throughout the
economy, both Federal and Provincial Governments desire and promote the
development and growth in  size of their respective agricultural sectors.
Clothed more extremely, this objective emerges in  some jurisdictions  as desire
for agricultural self-sufficiency.  Second, consistent with a  broader goal of
reasonable price stability, many agricultural policies arise from a  desire to
stabilize farm-gate prices.  In more aggregate terms,  this concern with price
stability can be manifested as a concern about inflation,  and from time to
ti e  there are worries about whether food prices are contributing to inflation.
When interventions in  agricultural markets have seemed appropriate to
governments, a  variety of economic rationales have been used.  These include
"destructive competition,"  structural imperfections,  inadequate information,
externalities, income distribution, agricultural fundamentalism, and
self-sufficiency.
More recently, three factors appear to be of  increased importance as part of
the environment affecting agricultural policy.  First, with the increased
integration of agriculture with the rest of the economy, concerns with
inflation, balance of payments, fiscal restraint, and other Government program
interactions have had a greater bearing on agricultural policy.  Second,
issues of national unity and Federal-Provincial relations have had an impact.
"...Divided jurisdictional responsibility for agriculture and food, and the
tendency for strong provincial governments to make program initiatives at the
22regional level and to seek a more influential role in national policy
development are...factors that have left their mark on national agriculture
and food policy"  (Forbes, Hughes,  and Warley, p. 17).  Finally, the political
environment has featured a generally unified and highly effective farm lobby
as well as competition between political parties trying to attract regional
blocks of farm votes with locally appropriate commodity programs.
Current Policy Structure
Before outlining key elements of current policy, a review of some quantitative
dimensions of Canadian agriculture might be useful to appreciate the ensuing
discussion and measurement.  The size of the industry, in terms of cash
receipts and number of farms, broken down by commodity groups,  is  shown in
table 1.  Cash receipts totaled almost $16 billion in  1980, and by the
following year, there were 170,000 farms with sales of  at least $2,500.  In
1977,  the share of primary agriculture in gross national product was 4.8
percent.
An important part of the general nature of agricultural policy in Canada can
be gleaned from Government expenditure data, and  the following table provides
an overview.  First, Brinkman suMmarizes Government expenditure by program
type (Table 6-1, p. 51),  and this table  is updated in table A-1 of Ralph
Lattimore's paper below.  This can be summarized as  follows for 1978-79, and
inspection of Lattimore's data for 1980 shows general similarity.
Table  1--Canadian  agriculture:  Total  farm cash  receipts
and number of farms, 1980/81, by commodity
:  Farm  :  Farms
Commodity  :  receipts  :  by  principal
:  (1980)  :  commodity (1981)
:Billion dollar  Number  Percent
Grains and oilseeds  :  5.351  107,866  39.7
Beef  :  3.663  60,139  22.2
Dairy  :  2.320  41,905  15.4
fogs  :  1.403  12,301  4.5
Poultry and eggs  :  1.058  5,438  2.0
Fruit and vegetables  :  .777  10,269  3.8
Other crops  :  .859  8,308  3.1
Other  livestock  :  .198  9,054  3.3
Other  :  .180  16,324  6.0
Total  :  15.809  271,604
Source:  Statistics Canada,
and  Statistics Canada,  1981
Net Farm Income, 1981 Preliminary;
Census  of Agriculture:  Canada.
23This listing neglects at least three important aspects of domestic agricul-
tural  policy.  The  Provinces  of  Canada  undertake  a  variety  of  agricultural
programs and they are neglected above.  Because they are responsible for
virtually  all extension  work  and  field  services  to  farmers,  table  2  represents
only a fraction of the total extension  expenditure in  the  country.  Provinces
also  engage  in  direct  payments  to  farmers,  typically  by  way  of  commodity
"stabilization" programs and credit subsidies.  Like  most  agricultural
stabilization programs in Canada, these provincial schemes are more often
concerned with income enhancement or transfers than price or income smoothing,
but they can be seen in Lattimore  (table A.1)  to account for little more than
10 percent, on average, of Federal expenditure in  this  area.
Second, the implicit subsidy contributed by the railways  to  export  grain
producers by virtue of the statutory  (Crow) rates is  ignored.  This  item, too,
is  found in Lattimore  (table A.1) and  the sum is  large  (estimated  to  be  $218
million Canadian in 1980).  The importance of the Crow rates in total  can be
seen in Harvey and Gibson, notably the substantial increase in the Crow
benefit  (grain transportation revenues--costs)  in recent  (and forecast)
years.  For 1980, this magnitude is  calculated by Gilson  to  be  $470  million.
Alternatively, the  fixed transportation rate from Saskatchewan to export
terminal for wheat is $5 per ton, while the calculated cost  (at  current
technology and rail  line procedures) is $22 per ton.
Finally, the third important omission of  Government agricultural  policy  in
table 2 is the market regulation imposed by marketing boards.  These  boards,
Table 2--Percentages of net direct expenditures  by  the
Federal Government on major agricultural  policies
and program areas, Canada, fiscal year 1978/79
:  Federal
Policy/program area  :  expenditures
:  Percent
Direct payment through commodity programs  :  30.5
Storage and freight assistance  :  19.3
Technical and  food aid  :  14.0
Research  :  11.1
Administrative and miscellaneous  :  6.1
Crop insurance  :  5.5
Social adjustment  and  rural economic
development  :  4.8
Testing service  :  3.8
Trade promotion  :  3.2
Extension and information services  :  .9
Direct payments  through social  programs  :  .5
Assistance  in producer  financing  :  .3
Total  :  100.0
Source:  Forbes,  Hughes,  and  Warley,  tables  1-4,  p.  13.
24sanctioned by statute and typically compulsory, are horizontal  cartels  of  farm
producers.  They are not unique to Canada but have emerged over the  last 20
years as a major policy tool of  considerable economic power, now covering over
half of gross farm sales.  The powers attributed to different boards vary
tremendously from the benign to full monopoly privileges.  The  latter  cases
are those with the power to control aggregate supplies, usually by means of
producer marketing quotas and some form of  import restriction.
These "supply-management" marketing boards  (or equivalent arrangements) are
presently found  in  the  dairy  industry  (both  fluid-and  industrial-milk
sectors);  the poultry industry, including broiler chicken,  eggs,  and  turkey;
and tobacco.
Because these boards have the most profound economic effects, the major
commodities  involved  (milk,  broilers,  and eggs) will  be  analyzed  in  this
paper.  This  is not to say that turkey and tobacco boards do not have
relatively important effects or that the remaining marketing boards, without
supply control powers, cannot influence producer returns,  consumer  prices,  or
resource allocation.  It is simply beyond the scope of  this  paper  to  cover
these other examples.  I  now turn to the individual commodity  analyses  to
provide some quantification of  the effects of policy  generally  alluded  to  so
far.
Measuring the Commodity Program Effects:  Grain and Oilseeds Sector
Wheat.  In describing the measurement of costs and transfers in each of the
three grain and oilseed commodities  (wheat, barley, and oilseeds),  I  will
first describe the major  policy issues, illustrate  them  in  a  supply/demand
diagram, describe how the relevant values were arrived at,  and  finally
calculate gains and  losses.
In the production of wheat, world-market prices prevail, but there are a
variety of Government programs or rules which subsidize production.  The most
important of these is  the statutory (Crow's Nest Pass)  rates  for  transporting
export grain.  Rail freight rates for moving grain from Prairie elevators to
export terminals are still fixed at  levels  first established  in 1897.  Recent
efforts by the Federal Government to come to grips with this issue have
generated the Gilson Report, upon whose estimates this paper shall rely.  The
effect of  this transportation subsidy, certainly in the short run, is to
increase the farm-gate price of grain relative  to its  level with freely
determined freight rates.
In addition, the Western Grains Stabilization Act (WGSA) guarantees  that the
average  (across the Prairies) gross margin (cash receipts  less cash expenses)
in any one year will not fall beneath its previous 5-year average.  The
Federal Government pays two-thirds of the contributions to the stabilization
fund,  plus  administration costs.  This  Government  contribution is  effectively
a  subsidy  to  participating farmers, inereasing  the  net  farm-gate  price  of
grain.
Third,  the Federal  Government  subsidizes  the  premium  required for  those
producers  participating in  the  Crop  Insurance  Program which  provides  all-risk
insurance  of  yield  variation.  Finally,  the  Federal  Government  subsidizes  both
the  interest  costs  of  making  advance  cash  payments  to  producers  (prior  to
actual sale) and the interest rate charged to export buyers.
25This  list of five programs which affect the wheat market  is not
comprehensive.  Provincial programs are ignored for  reasons  of  data.  The
Temporary Wheat Reserve Program is  ignored because no Federal funds have been
incurred since 1973.  Similarly, the Two-Price Wheat  program  is  not  included
because it ended  in 1978, and because it was largely a consumer subsidy.  Its
total producer benefits, averaged over the period, have a smaller effect than
the  Prairie Grain Cash  Advance  Program.
The  wheat market in Canada, at the farm gate level, can  then  be  analyzed  as  in
figure 1.  Canada is assumed to be a price taker on world markets, on the
basis of Harvey's estimate that the (excess) demand curve for Canadian wheat
is  -20  or  larger  (in  absolute  value)  (Harvey,  pp.  19-21).  The  supply
elasticity  was  assumed  to  be  0.5  in  the  long run,  a  value  which  appeared
reasonable  in  light of  substitution  possibilities with  beef  at  the  margin.
Few estimates of the supply elasticities of grains as  a  group  (for  example,  to
consider  the  effects  of  removing  the  subsidies on  all  grains  simultaneously)
exist for Canada, and this value was also assumed by Josling  for the long
run.  Po  is the received price, Pe  is the price that  would  be  received
without the subsidy distortion, Po  - Pe,  and Qo is the  level  of
production, given the subsidies.  One additional  complication  is  added  by  the
Canadian Wheat  Board's delivery quota system.  In  many  years  these  quotas
limit  the  producers  to  market  less  than  they  would prefer.  These  quotas  then
take  on  an  implicit value, and  the  supply  curve  cutting Po  and  Q0, S',  is




26The unregulated price and quantity are then given by point C.  The familiar
triangle of welfare cost  is ABC, assuming no other distortions.  The existence
of other distortions generate welfare rectangles with a size given by the
product of  the distortion and the change in production due to  the wheat
subsidy.  Producers gain by the rectangle (Po - Pe) Qo less  triangle
ABC.  Consumers are unaffected by these policies, so their net gain is zero.
Whoever finances the subsidies noted above, in this case the Federal
Government and the railways (delivering grain below cost),  loses by the
rectangle (Po  Pe) Qo
Because of the recognized instability in the grain market, data were collected
from the decade of the seventies.  All prices were transformed into 1980
dollars and that was considered the key year for the analysis.  The real
farm-gate price of wheat increased over the 1971-81 period,  and the fitted
trend line was used to remove transitory movements.  The estimated value for
1980, $178 per ton, was actually equal to the observed price.  Because
production  levels showed  less variability, the mean value for the most recent
5 year period, 1977-81, was used  (20.374 million ton).  The Crow subsidy was
calculated from Gilson's recent report as the 1980 gap between rail transport
costs and the legislated rate levels  (a total subsidy of $470 million, or a
per ton subsidy to wheat of $17.39.  The WGSA subsidy, based on Federal
contributions to the fund (not actual payments),  was averaged over the
program's history, 1976 to 1981, an average payment of $91.8 million  in 1980
dollars.  This was prorated to each eligible grain arbitrarily, by their
respective shares in production, and for wheat this came to $2.98 per ton.
Similar procedures where adopted for Crop Insurance, Prairie Grain Cash
Advances, and Grain Export Credits.  The 1976-80 Federal expenditure, in 1980
dollars, was averaged over the 5 years, allocated to eligible grains by their
respective production share, and put in values per ton.  For wheat, the unit
subsidies were $$2.36  per ton for Crop Insurance, $0.25 per ton for Cash
Advances, and $0.45 per ton for Grain Export Credit.  The annual cost  (value
of the delivery quota was calculated by Lattimore  (table B.6),  also averaged
over the years 1976 to 1980, was $7 per ton.
In terms of  figure 1,  this translates as Qo =  20.374 tons, Po =  $178 per
ton, Pe =  $154.57 per ton, point A =  $171, and point C =  $19.44 million
tons.  With the total subsidy at $23.43 per ton, the transfers are readily
calculated.  Producers gain by $470 million per year, consumers are unaffected
because we have ignored the old Two-Price Wheat Program, and taxpayers and
railways jointly suffer the loss of $477 million.  On the basis of Lattimore's
estimates  (table A.1)  of the railway contribution to the Crow Gap, this $477
million cost breaks down to $306.9 million from the Federal Government and
$170.5 million from the railways.
The social efficiency gain (welfare loss)  is  not so quickly reckoned.  To
begin with, the familiar triangle loss, ABC in  figure 1,  is  relatively
trivial, $7.67 million.  However, other resource allocation effects can be
considered.  First, there is  the problem of other significant distortions in
the economy affected by this policy-induced  increase in  wheat production.  Due
to Canadian tariff policy, the social cost of foreign exchange does not equal
the private cost, and because wheat is  traded, this generates an efficiency
effect.  Jenkins and Kuo have estimated the (social) value of a (private)
dollar of foreign exchange is  $1.07,  generating a  foreign-exchange benefit
from increased wheat exports of $10.1 million.  Some of this will be offset by
imported inputs, and assuming a  share of 25 percent for  imported inputs in
total cost, the net foreign exchange benefit is  $7.6 million.  No other
27distortion  effects were calculated.  On this basis,  foreign  exchange  benefits
offset the triangle loss of $7.67  million, to  leave virtually no efficiency
effects.
However, I have ignored one reputedly important efficiency effect of Wheat
Board policy, and that is  the effect on resource allocation of  the delivery
quotas.  It  is widely acknowledged (Harvey, Furtan, Lee, and MacLaren) that
the quota  system has  led among other effects to extensive land use, low
adoption rates for high yielding varieties, and  low levels of fertilizer and
chemical use.  These arguments imply that the quota system has  caused  the  real
resource  supply  curve  to  shift  to  the  left  from  where  it  would  otherwise  be.
The efficiency affect is  potentially enormous, being calculated  as  the  area
.between these two supply curves.  MacLaren, for example, has estimated that
Canada would produce 5  million tons more wheat in  the absence of these quotas,
due to the change in  resource use.  Even if  such an  effect  has  only  pivoted
the supply from some point halfway along its  length, MacLaren's estimate in
the  context  of  figure  1  would  imply a welfare  cost  of  some  $300  million.
Measurement of this  effect is  beyond this paper, and  I  merely  point  it  out  to
show that, in  all likelihood,  the efficiency effect of the delivery quota
system swamps any other efficiency effects by several orders of magnitude, and
that any concerted effort to measure the efficiency effects of Canada's grain
policy requires examination of this  issue.
Barley.  The barley market was analyzed in  an analogous manner to the
wheat-market  analysis outlined above.  The only additional  consideration  was
the feed grain policy in  Canada, specifically the corn tariff of $0.08/bushel
($3.15/ton).  All of the earlier caveats continue to apply, notably the
possibility of program omissions, efficiency effects  of the CWB delivery
quotas,  and  the  long-run  accuracy  of  the  Crow benefit/gap  calculations.
The data  are the following.  The estimated trend price, 1980 dollars, is
$120/ton, and production is  11.058 million tons.  The Crow subsidy is  $17.41
per ton, the corn tariff $3.15 per ton, WGSA subsidy of  $1.15  per  ton,  Crop
Insurance  subsidy of $0.90 per ton, Cash Advance subsidy  of  $0.10,  and  Grain
Export  Credit subsidy is  $0.17  per ton.  The total subsidy  is  $22.88  per  ton,
and  the quota  value,  translated  into  barley  production  is  $5.04  per  ton.  In
terms of  figure 1,  Po=$120, Pe=$97.18, Qo=11.058 million tons,  point A =
$114.60, and point C  = 10.26 million tons.  The welfare loss triangle, ABC, is
$7  million, but an offsetting foreign exchange benefit of $3.7 million leaves
a  net  efficiency  loss  of  $3.3  million.  Producers  gain  $246  million  from  these
policies, which are  financed by Federal Government, taxpayers gain $160
million, and the railroads $93 million.  The corn tariff imposes a  cost on
feed grain users which is  presently uncalculated.
Rapeseed.  Once more, the procedures followed in  the rapeseed market are the
same as for the two preceding grains, except that the Prairie Grain Cash
Advance  Program does  not  apply  to  rapeseed.  Furthermore,  because  real
rapeseed prices have shown less of a  pattern than wheat or barley prices, the
iean value of the 1971-81 period was used.  This price is  $309  per ton,
production  is  2.632  million  tons,  the  Crow  subsidy  is  $17.06  per  ton,  WGSA  is
$5.10  per  ton,  Crop  Insurance  is  $4.03  per ton,  Grain Export  Credit is  $0.76,
and the effective cost of grain delivery quotas in  Board grains is  $10.80 per
ton.  In terms of figure 1,  the efficiency loss  triangle is  only $0.54 million,
Po=  $309,  Pe=282,  Qo=2.632,  point  A = 298,  and  point  C = 2.565  million  tons.
28but  with  the  foreign-exchange  premium  of  $0.99 million,  these  calculations
show  a  welfare  gain  from  rapeseed  policy  of  $0.45 million.  Producers  gain  by
$70 million, and this  is  financed by the Federal Government,  $49  million,  and
railways, $22 million.
These results for  the grains and oilseeds sector are  summarized  and  compared
to recent results by Josling, Harling,  and Thompson, using  comparable
elasticity estimates  to those of this paper.
The most notable results are the larger transfers to producers found  in this
paper.  This is  partly due to using 1980 dollars, but mostly  due  to  the  growth
in the more recent estimates of the Crow Benefit.  Fully three-quarters of my
transfer estimates are due  to the Crow Benefit.  Finally, my efficiency losses
are comparable if only the familiar triangle  loss is considered.  The
foreign-exchange benefit reduces my net efficiency losses.  Even so,  I suspect
these efficiency cost  comparisons are virtually  irrelevant compared to the
important omission of the efficiency losses due to the  delivery  quotas.
Poultry Sector.  The analysis of the poultry sector in Canada features fewer
actual programs, but such market intervention, supply  prices  are not  directly
observable, and economic analysis requires some subtlety.  Marketing boards
exist for both broilers and eggs, and these markets feature  administered
prices  (a  pricing formula is  usually involved); a variety of  levies which
reduce  the net  farm-gate  price;  aggregate  and  individual  farm  quotas;  import
quotas at relatively  low levels; a variety of production rules regarding space
requirements per bird;  cycles of production per year,  and  bird weights  in
broilers;  size limits per farm; and restrictions on vertical  integration.  The
analysis will begin with eggs,  in more detail, and broilers will be summarized
secondly.





29This market operates by the board setting a price, Po, and a quota on
production  Q.  The net  effect  is  to  reduce  output  from  Qe  and  raise  price
above Pe,  causing welfare costs and transfers, analogous to the familiar
case of a monopolist.  The producer gain will be PoAEPe less EBC,  the
consumer  loss  will  be  PoABPe,  and  the  economy  gain  will be  their sum,  a
loss of ABC.  Additional twists are due to  Canada's egg  market  regime.
Reported  prices  are  for  table  eggs,  yet  any  surpluses  are  sent  to  the  breaker
market in Canada or the  United  States.  A  blend  price  between  these  two
markets  is  the  appropriate measure  of  Po.  Levies  are  collected  from  farmers
to finance the administration of the regime  (measured as DC).  Not only does
this mean that one can mistakenly identify S'  as the  supply  curve  instead  of
the true S, but it means an added resource allocation loss,  DCOF, resources
that would otherwise not be spent in the production and  marketing  of  eggs.
The  various  production restrictions  such  as  farm  size,  limits,  may  have  an
effect on production costs.  The present supply may  indeed  be  S,  but  without
production restrictions the supply curve could be lower,  such  as  the  curve  S"
in figure 2.  If this is  so, the resource  losses would  be  substantial,
measured as the  area between S and  S" from the origin  to  the  demand  curve.  We
do not have enough information to properly identify this potential  loss.  As
will be seen later, this potential loss would appear to  be  small  or
nonexistent.  Finally,  trade effects are not illustrated  in  figure  2.  This  is
not because they are potentially unimportant.  Rather, in both egg and broiler
markets, when considering  real resource costs, Canada  appears  to  be
approximately competitive  in supplying  the domestic market.  Given the
approximations of our data, trade effects appear to  be  too  small  to  be
significant.
Turning to measurement, the demand  curve is  assumed to have an elasticity at
the farm gate of -0.225 (George and King).  It represents  something of a blend
between the table egg and breaker-egg market, and  the quantity in 1980, 488
million dozen, and the net producer price, $0.755/dozen correspond.  This
price is calculated  as the average reported farm price  ($0.79)  less  the
"consumer subsidy" levy of $0.025/dozen and an export levy of $0.01/dozen,
both in place to finance moving surplus table eggs to  the  breaker  markets.  It
is assumed that no surplus eggs are destroyed, at additional  cost,  an
assumption  that has  not always  been accurate in the past.  The  supply  curve  is
assumed to have unit elasticity, a compromise between the apparent ease of
establishing additional chicken or egg "factories" and elasticities reported
in Askari and Cummings between 0.2 and 0.5.
The positioning of  the supply curve is  quite another matter.  There are no
direct observations to use, given that at the margin of production we only
know from the scarcity of quotas and tendency to produce in excess of quota
limits  that the net farm price exceeds the supply price.  My attempts at
estimating  this  supply  price  follow  three  lines,  inference  from  data  on  the
market  for quotas,  feed-cost  rules  of  thumb,  and  U.S.  price  comparisons.
Encouragingly,  all  measures  are  quite  consistent,  particularly for  eggs.
The  analysis  of  quota  prices  is  quite  complex,  as  befits  a  financial  asset
which  is  very  much  like  a  common  stock.  The  problem  is  to  determine  the
annual  rental price,  given  the  stock  price.  One  must  make  assumptions  about
capital gains, opportunity costs of funds, the risk premium needed to
compensate for uncertainty about policy changes, and any expectations of
future allocations  of  new  quota  (gratis)  to  existing  quota  holders
(Barichello, 1982).  All of this assumes good data on the stock price of
quota, an assumption whose accuracy is not clear.
30However, from a partially filled matrix on quota prices across provinces and
from 1975 to 1981, I am able to begin.  The average quota price for eggs
across Canada in 1980, reported, for example,  in Arcus,  is  $12.65  per  layer.
An assumption of capital gains at the rate of 3 percent in real terms appears
reasonable from the quota price data, and a private opportunity cost of
capital in agriculture appears to average 6  percent (Jenkins).  I  have  no
direct observations on the risk premium that is  felt necessary in this market
but from discussions with poultry producers, it would  seem  at least  as  much  as
in the dairy industry, with which I am more familiar and  about  which  I  have
some data.  In milk, quota markets, the risk is seen to be sufficiently great
that purchasers of this asset will discount its future  returns  at  a  rate
equivalent to paying back principal plus  interest in  4  years.  Alternatively,
an interest rate of almost 29 percent (in real terms)  is used to discount an
infinite  stream  of  benefits.
Using this assumption for the poultry  (egg and broiler)  quotas,  and  assuming
20 dozen eggs per layer per year, the annual rent to  egg  quota  is  just  over
$0.14 per dozen  ($14.35).  This would be the distance AD  in  figure  2,  and
given 2 $0.005 dozen administrative levy (DC), the supply price of eggs  in
Canada, 1980, would be $0.58650/dozen.
A  feed-price rule  of  thumb,  gleaned  from  egg  and broiler national  cost  of
production  formula, and  from  casual  observation  of  industry experts,  is  that
feed prices account for 60 to 65 percent of costs.  For average feed prices,
this results in egg costs between $0.573 and $0.621/dozen.  However, casually
calculated, this range does bracket the supply price derived  from  quota  prices
above.
Finally, an examination of U.S. prices can provide another  point  of
comparison.  As  long as these prices are obtained without  production
regulation, and as long as the technology can move freely across  the border,
the U.S. price in the northern States,  closest to Canada and Canadian
conditions, should give a measure of potential costs in  Canada.  Taking  both
1979 and 1980 data to smooth fluctuations, the average farm price in the
northernmost States with significant (1 billion eggs sold)  production is
$0.509/dozen.  At the 1980 exchange rate, this becomes $0.606/dozen in
Canadian dollars.
All three measures are encouragingly similar, averaging  some $0.591/dozen, and
this will be taken as the Canadian supply price of eggs,  point C in figure 2.
Furthermore, these data suggest that U.S. costs are not significantly less
than Canadian costs.  Either the production restrictions  imposed have a small
effect on costs, or there are other cost advantages which offset the cost
disadvantages of the restrictions.
To  complete  the  data  requirements  of  figure  2,  we  must  know  Pe  and  Qe  and
from  the  above,  Pe=  $0.615  per  dozen  and  Qe=5 0 8 .5  million  dozen.  Only  one
additional efficiency  cost  is  added,  and  that is  extra  cost  embodied  in the
feed-grain  tariff.  Counting  this  as  part of  Canadian agricultural policy,  its
removal  would  shift  the  supply  curve  to  the  right,  as  it  turns  out  by  one  cent
per  dozen.  Including  this gives  us  our final  estimates  of  Pe  and  Qe'
$0.58 per dozen and 509.7 million dozen, respectively.
31The resulting economic effects are calculated.  Producers  gain the area
PoAEPe less EBC, calculated net of  the administrative levy and  the extra
feed cost of the feed-grain tariff,  or $55.20 million.  Consumers  lose
PoABPe,  or $74.229 million.  The difference is the social efficiency loss
or $18.979 million.  These numbers ignore any other tariff impacts,  they
ignore other economy-wide distortions,  and the foreign-exchange benefit is
seen as being too small to calculate, given the accuracy of our numbers.  They
also ignore to a large extent the social loss  of resources used to preserve
rents, and they ignore any monopoly rents or inefficiencies created or
encouraged beyond the farm gate.  They do account  in some manner for most of
the regulatory rules, and they do give some hint of the net export position
Canada once had in eggs.
Broilers.  The broiler market is  analyzed in much the same way as that
outlined above for eggs.  One notable difference is  in terms of Q  in figure
2.  In the broiler industry, production is  limited  to an amount less  than that
consumed, due to the allowance of a significant  (some 6 percent of production)
quantity of imported product.  This means, in terms of figure 2, that the
resource allocation loss  of foregone production rents is  somewhat larger than
BC, because the line EC is  further to the left.  Otherwise, the enumeration
of efficiency losses and transfers follows exactly.
The demand elasticity is assumed to be -0.6  (George and King),  the weighted
average price to producers across Canada for 1980  is $0.423 per pound, and the
quantity consumed  is 913.164 million pounds  (eviscerated meat basis,  or
1,217.6 million pounds liveweight basis.  The supply curve of chicken was
assumed to have unit elasticity, as for eggs.  Production of broiler chicken
was 860.250 million pounds  (1,147 million pounds  liveweight),  and a levy of
$0.05 per pound was charged for the administration of  the local  (provincial)
and national marketing boards.
The supply price calculations,  using quota price data, began with an average
quota price across Canada of $8.00 per bird space.  Capital gains appeared to
be somewhat  less than for eggs, and a real rate of 2 percent real was
assumed.  A risk premium was added to the opportunity cost of capital as  for
eggs, resulting in a discount rate of 28.86 percent.  Given an average of 4.55
production cycles per year and an average bird size of 4.08 pounds liveweight,
this quota price data implied an annual quota cost  (rent) of $0.115 per pound
liveweight.  Given a price of $0.423 per pound and a levy of $0.05 per pound,
these quota rent calculations imply the farm cost of production (supply price)
is $0.303 per pound in 1980.
Using a comparable feed-cost rule of thumb as for eggs  (feed costs are 60-65
percent of  total costs) we calculate the cost of chicken to be within the
range of $0.3096-$0.3354 per pound (an average of $0.322 per pound).  U.S.
price comparisons from the northern states  show an average 1980 farm price of
$0.2899 per pound, or in Canadian dollars, $0.345 per pound.
These numbers are more variable than for eggs, but are still reasonably well
bounded.  A  mean value from the three estimates, $0.32 per pound, was used as
the supply price for chicken (point C in fig. 2).  Finally, the feed-grain
tariff increases the cost of producing chicken by $0.005 per pound.  The net
result is an equilibrium price, Pe, of $0.362 per pound and an equilibrium
quantity of 1,323 million pounds liveweight.
32From these numbers, the consumer cost is calculated as  $73.18  million,  the
producer gain as $56.64 million, the gain by importers  (right of first
receivership assuming a landed cost equal to Pe,  $0.36  Canadian)  is  $4.07
million,  and  the  total  efficiency  loss  is  $13  million.
Despite their quite different administration, the supply management regimes in
eggs  and broilers have very similar effects as  can be noted in table 3.  The
Table 3--Economic effects of poultry industry
farm-gate level,  Canada
regulation,,
:  :  :  :Harling  and
Economic  :  Barichello  :  Arcus  :  Veeman  :Thompson
gain  :  1980  :  1979  :  1979  :  1975-77
:  Million dollars
Eggs:  :
Economy  :  -19  --  -0.4  -5
Producer  :  55  45  38  74
Consumer  :  -74  -56  -39  -80
Broilers:
Economy  :  -13  --  -5  -11
Producer  :  57  71  71  94
Consumer  :  -73  -77  -76  -121
Importer  :  4  --  --  --
--  Not  applicable.
main difference is  the  larger efficiency loss in eggs,  due to the added
administrative cost  incurred in running the egg marketing regime.  It is
interesting to note that both schemes are still relatively expensive means
of transferring  income to producers.  In eggs,  $1.35 must be spent to
transfer $1 to producers, a waste of $0.35 per dollar of transfer.  This
cost in broilers is  $1.24,  a  waste of $0.24 per dollar of transfer.
Table 3  compares these results with those of  regulated studies.  All are
generally similar, although Veeman's transfer estimates on eggs appear
low, and Harling and Thompson's transfer estimates  for broilers appear
very high.  One point worth noting  is  that the transfers  imply that on
average each egg  and broiler farm gains by some $25,000.  Although the
grain sector featured a large transfer to producers  in aggregate terms
(seven times as  large as the poultry-industry transfer),  the benefit per
farm  is  only  about  $5,000  or  one-fifth  the  per  farm benefit  on  poultry
farms.
Dairy Industry.  The dairy industry in Canada,  like many around the world,
is  highly  regulated,  and  like  the  poultry  industries,  output  is  controlled
by  quotas  in  a  supply  management  regime.  Unlike  the  poultry  industry,  the
dairy  industry accounts  for  significant  number  of  farmers  (about  1  in  6)
and 15 percent of total cash receipts.  This is even more true regionally,
notable  in  Quebec  where  milk sales  account  for one-third  of  all  farm  cash
33receipts, and Ontario where the figure is  20 percent.  It  also  accounts
for  a  large  fraction  of  Government  agricultural  commodity  expenditures
and, as shall be seen, the  largest total benefits from  agricultural  policy
of  any  commodity  group.  Because  fluid-  and  industrial-milk  production
involve different Government programs (Provincial and Federal
jurisdictions, respectively) I will analyze them separately.
Fluid  Milk.  The rules  in this sector are generally straightforward.
Imports are prohibited, prices are administered, usually  by  formula,  to
maintain a  price premium above industrial milk, quotas  limit  aggregate  and
individual farm production, and each Province is  self-sufficient  (except
Newfoundland).  These  provincial fluid-milk  regimes  are  clear  examples  of
local monopolies with the advantage that excess production  is  channelled
into  industrial-milk markets,  avoiding  any  surplus  problems  and  keeping
administrative  costs  low.
The  diagram of  figure  2,  simplified  to  include  only  one  supply  curve,
summarizes  the  fluid-milk  market.  The  measures  of  gains  and  losses  are
the same as those  outlined earlier.  Because rules,  prices,  and  quantities
differ by Province, each one must be analyzed separately,  involving  too
much detail to describe here.  No trade effects are considered.  The
analysis  here,  notably  for  supply prices,  continues  the  assumption  of
self-sufficiency  in  each  Province.  Therefore,  the  efficiency  losses  and
transfers will definitely be understated.  If the alternative was a
program of purchasing constituents on the world market  and  reconstituting
them in Canada, the numbers would be larger still.  There are relatively
few direct production restrictions embodied in fluid  regulation,  aside
from health standards.  Consequently there would  seem  to  be  fewer  cases  of
regulation-induced  supply  curve  shifts  than  in  the poultry  industries,
except for the common possibility of reduced adoption of  some innovations
and related long-run efficiency issues.  Rent-preserving activities are
again neglected.
Brief  mention  should  be  made  of  the  estimation  of  supply  prices.  The  sole
means of doing so was to draw inferences from quota price data.  On the
basis of  quota price and allocation data by Province, expected  capital
gains in the value of one's quota stock was estimated by Province.  A
common opportunity cost of capital (6  percent in real terms)  was assumed,
and  on  the basis  of  data  from British  Columbia  and  Ontario,  the  risk
premium required for investing in this risky asset was  calculated to be
some 22 percent (approximately a 4-year payback).  The demand elasticity
was assumed to be -0.35 and a supply elasticity of 1.0 was used.  The
producer  gain  was  calculated  with reference  to  quota  levels  (inclusive  of
some industrial milk) and the consumer loss was calculated with reference
to  actual  consumption  levels.
34The  results  are  shown in  table  4.  Partly  due  to  the  inelastic  demand,  the
transfer of  income from consumers to producers is  large.
Table  4---Economic  effects  of  fluid-milk  regulation  calculated  by
province in 1980 dollars at the farm gate, Canada
Economic  :  Amount
gain  :
:  Million dollars
Economy  :  -52.4
Producer  365.8
Consumer  :  -431.7
However, it is






relatively little waste, as the cost of moving a
is $1.14.  This waste of $0.14 per dollar compares
dollar  transferred  in  the broiler  and  egg  industries,
Industrial Milk.  Compared  to  fluid  milk policy,  regulation  in  Canada's
industrial-milk  market  is  complex  indeed.  It  too  features  formula  pricing
with  quotas  to  constrain  output.  Quotas  are  set  at  a  level  which  preserves
self-sufficiency  for  Canada  in  butterfat.  The  price  of  industrial milk  is  met
by a direct subsidy plus support prices  for the two milk constituents,
butterfat  and  nonfat  solids  (skim).  Given  the  quota  level  of  production  and
the  support  prices  chosen,  there  is  a  domestic  surplus  of  nonfat  solids.  This
must  be  exported  to  offshore markets,  usually  in  the  form  of  skim-milk  powder
and  evaporated  milk,  and  at world-market  prices,  substantial  losses  are
incurred.  These are largely financed with a series of levies on producers,
although  a  longer  term solution  in  more  extreme  situations  would  be  some
reduction in quotas.  In addition, trade is  strictly controlled.  There is
virtually an embargo on butter imports, and annual  cheese imports are
restricted to 45 million pounds,  less than 5 percent of total  industrial milk
supply.
The  analysis  of  this market  is  complicated  by  a  lack  of  data.
direct information  on  the demand for industrial milk, only the
industrial milk products,  and the supply side is obscured like
There is no
demand for
the case in all
35supply managed commodities.  Figure 3 outlines the  nature of  the  market.  The
demand  for  industrial milk,  D,  is  measured  as  the  vertical  sum  of  the  demand







We know one point on each of  those two demand curves, the support price and
accompanying domestic disappearance.  The demand curve for nonfat solids is
assumed  to  be  -1.15  and  for  butterfat  -1.40,  implying  a  demand for industrial
milk with elasticity -0.9.  Arguments to support these assumptions are found
in Barichello,  1981.
The supply curve is  positioned from quota price data as previously discussed,
using quota price data from Ontario and Quebec.  An implicit rental for this
quota in Ontario provides an additional source of evidence to give increased
confidence to supply price estimates.  The supply elasticity is assumed again
to  be  unit elastic.
Finally, the world price is  calculated to  consider the costs of restricting
this trade.  However, if Canada entered that market on such a scale, with the
marginal supplier being New Zealand, it would surely have some effect on the
world price.  Assuming an excess supply elasticity from New Zealand  of a least
0.75,  and  iterating for different  world  prices  until an  equilibrium  is
reached, we find that Canada would bid up the world price by 38.6 percent,
given the elasticities assumed and the 1978-80 average world prices for butter
and  skim-milk  powder.
36These procedures give the following values to the lettered points in figure 3:
A =  $32.76 per hectoliter, 46 million hectoliters;
B =  $24.96,  46;
C =  $23.75,  46;
D =  $19.22,  46;
E =  $21.61,  35;
F =  $31.43,  35;
G =  $17.63,  35.6;
H =  $17.63, 58.65;
J =  $22.75,  46.
The welfare costs have 4 components.  First, the export of surplus skim-milk
products at world prices denies the Canadian market of the consumer surplus in
area FBDE, $85.6 million.  Compared to the world price, Pw, excess
production resources are used, a loss  illustrated by triangle JKG,  $26.6
million.  Again, compared to world prices, consumer  surplus is  lost, measured
by area BHK, or $46.4 million.  Offsetting these costs  is a benefit of
additional foreign-exchange earnings  (savings),  worth $28.4 million.  The net
social efficiency loss  is $161.8 million.  If one  ignores the trade side, the
net efficiency loss is  still sizeable, $117.3 million.
The producer gain is measured as PoAJGPw, less  the overlap with the fluid
markets, or $628.7 million.  The consumer loss  is  estimated directly from the
butterfat and nonfat solids demand curves, measuring the surplus in moving
from 1980  support prices to world prices, a total  loss of $548.1 million.
Finally, taxpayers also have an important interest in this policy, as they
suffer a  loss of $303 million.
These results are combined with the fluid-market results in  table 5,  where
comparisons with Josling's results are made.  The results  are quite
comparable, even more so since the Economic Council Studies were completed,
due largely to evaluating the fluid-milk programs Province by Province as was
reported above in  table 4.  Two interesting calculations can be made from this
table.  First, the cost of  transferring a  dollar to producers is  some $1.22.
Table 5--Economic effects of  fluid-milk regulation,
farm gate level, Canada
Economic  :  Barichello  :  Josling
gain  :  1980 $  :  1978/79
:  lillion dollars
Economy  :  -214  -275
Producer  :  995  905
Consumer  :  -980  -623
Taxpayer  :  -303  --
-- Not applicable.
37This waste of $0.22  is the  average  of $0.26  in  the  industrial  milk  program  and
$0.14 in fluid-milk policy.  Despite the absolute size  of  these  numbers,  this
transfer  is  still made with  less waste than  in the  two  poultry  programs.
Furthermore, the per farm benefits are lower.
The dairy program producer benefits, although $1 billion annually, average
about $20,000 per farm, 80 percent  of comparable figures  in  the  poultry
industry.
Conclusions
This variety of measurements can best be seen in summary  form  in  table  6.  The
large numbers due to the dairy program are immediately  striking,  but  on  a  per
Table  6--Summary  of  economic  effects  of  selected
Canadian agricultural policies
:  Economic gains
Item
Economy  :  Producer  :  Consumer  :  Taxpayer
:  Million dollars
Wheat  :  tr*  470  0  -307
Barley  :  -3  246  0  -160
Rapeseed:  tr*  70  0  -49
Eggs  :  -19  55  -74  --
Broilers:  -13  57  -73  --
Dairy  :  -214  995  -980  -303
-- Not applicable.
*  tr.= less than $1  million.
farm basis,  the poultry industry producer transfers are larger,  and the cost
to  the economy is  proportionately greater  (per dollar of  transfer).  Also of
importance is  the potential size of unmeasured efficiency losses in  the grain
and oilseeds sector, notable with respect to the delivery quota and rail
transportation system.
In all,  these  numbers  provide  useful  information  in  the  assessment  of
Government  policy.  This  sample  of  agricultural policies  is  far from  benign  in
its effects and the transfers are clearly important.  And, these effects
differ widely  by  sector,  making  generalizations  difficult.  But,  it  is
important to note that these numbers must be viewed and interpreted with
caution.  A number  of  important parameters  were  assumed  and  a variety  of
errors,  certainly  omissions,  must  remain.  Even  so,  the estimates  are
generally  quite  robust across  different  studies  and  assumptions.  As  rough
guides  to  the  effects  of  agricultural  policy  they  are probably helpful,  and
they  certainly point  the  way  to  additional productive  work.
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